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Abstract—Survivable design of cross-layer networks, such as
the cloud computing infrastructure, lies in its resource de-
ployment and allocation and mapping of the logical (virtual
datacenter/IP) network into the physical infrastructure (cloud
backbone/WDM) such that link or node failure(s) in the physical
infrastructure would not result in cascading failures in the
logical network. Most of the prior approaches for survivable
cross-layer network design aim at single-link failure scenario,
which are not applicable to the more challenging multi-failure
scenarios. Also, as many of these approaches use the cross-
layer cut concept, enumeration of all cuts in the network is
required and thus introducing exponential number of constraints.
To overcome these difficulties, we investigate in this paper
survivable mapping approaches against multiple physical link
failures and its special case, Shared Risk Link Group (SRLG)
failure. We present the necessary and sufficient conditions based
on both cross-layer spanning trees and cutsets to guarantee a
survivable mapping when multiple physical link failures occur.
Based on the necessary and sufficient conditions, we propose
to solve the problem through (1) mixed-integer linear programs
which avoid enumerating all combinations of link failures, and
(2) an algorithm which generates/adds logical spanning trees
sequentially. Our simulation results show that the proposed
approaches can produce survivable mappings effectively against
both k- and SRLG-failures.
Index Terms—Cross-layer networks, survivability, multiple
failures, SRLG failures, optical communication
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing through which demands of geographically
distributed individuals and enterprise are realized seamlessly
over a common physical cloud infrastructure/backbone has
attracted significant attention in recent years both in academia
and industry. Cloud service providers offer their users an
abstracted layer of computational (processors/memory) and
communication resources considered as a virtual datacenter,
and cloud services are then carried out through virtual-machine
deployment and its mapping to the physical datacenters and
their data connections in the cloud infrastructure [1][2]. Figure
1 illustrates a cloud computing infrastructure, where the virtual
datacenter (top-layer) consists of interconnected virtual ma-
chines is mapped onto the cloud infrastructure (bottom-layer)
with datacenters and communication networks. As each cloud
service provider usually supports multiple tenants, each virtual
machine is allocated with a fraction of the computational
capacity of the correspondingly mapped datacenters, and the
Zhili Zhou is with the United Airlines.
Tachun Lin is with the Department of Computer Science and In-
formation Systems, Bradley University, Peoria, IL 61625, USA (e-mail:
djlin@bradley.edu.)
Krishnaiyan Thulasiraman is with the School of Computer Science, Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019, USA.
links connecting virtual machines would also occupy a portion
of the overall capacity of the fiber-optic connections at the
cloud backbone. Hence, failure(s) in the physical infrastructure
may disconnect both physical datacenters and virtual machines
and decrease the computational and communication capacities
of the cloud. This has motivated studies on the problems of
resilient and survivable network design.
A virtual datacenter is claimed to be survivable if its
services sustain when failure(s), such as link failures in optical
networks [3] or power outage in datacenters [4], occur in the
cloud infrastructure. In this paper, we use network survivability
as a measure to identify if a network remains connected against
instantaneous failures [5][6][7][8]. The approaches to guaran-
tee virtual datacenter survivability can be achieved in different
layers. Since the optical network is the major communication
media in a cloud infrastructure connecting datacenters, the first
approach is to protect the internet protocol (IP) traffic over op-
tical networks or virtual network traffic over physical substrate
network through backup protection, which ensures that the
fiber/phyiscal link is protected by either a dedicated or shared
backup fiber/physical link. 1+1, 1:1, and 1:N protection [9]
are the traditional but most commonly applied approaches. For
the link-failure case, two-stage approaches with reactive re-
routing are explored in [10][11], and network/service backup
provisioning as proactive approaches are proposed in [12][13].
As a node failure results in multiple link failures, the failure-
dependent protection is introduced in [6][14] where backup
nodes are utilized; and the failure-independent protection
discussed in [15][16][17][18][19] targets to provide the same
level of protection under a single node/link failure scenario
with less substrate resources. A closely related work on
reliable cross-layer network design emphasizes controlling
the failure probability of the entire network considering link
failure probability. Probabilistic analysis [20] and scenario-
based approaches [21][22][23][24] are proposed for multiple
link failures and disaster recovery.
Different from backup-provisioning and probability-based
approaches mentioned above, our cross-layer survivable rout-
ing scheme maximally utilizes existing resources and protects
the topology through routing. Due to its NP-completeness [25],
early works are mostly concentrated on single physical link
failure scenario. Kurant and Thiran [26] proposed a disjoint-
path-based protection scheme to guarantee the sufficient con-
dition for cross-layer network survivability, where logical
cycles are mapped onto link-disjoint paths iteratively. Zhou
et al. [27][28] provided necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of survivable design using the concept of
protecting spanning trees, while Modiano and Narula-Tam [29]
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Fig. 1. Cloud computing infrastructure
proposed a different approach based on cross-layer cutsets.
To address the scenario of multiple physical link failures,
Todimala and Ramamurthy [30] studied survivable mappings
against a single SRLG failure. The approach proposed in [30]
is also based on cross-layer cutsets introduced in [29]. Here
SRLG means a group of network links routed through the
same fiber, thus the fiber cut causes simultaneous failures to
this group of links. Jaumard et al. [31] and Parandehgheibi et
al. [32] proposed the use of minimal path sets for survivable
routing after single link failure. Xi et al. [33] considered
rerouting as a restoration scheme to recover SRLG failures
in IP-over-WDM networks. Similar concepts have also been
applied to the survivable cloud network mapping problem [7].
For instance, an integrated approach with content place-
ment/replica and routing was introduced in [4][34], anycast
routing presented in [35][36], and multi-path routing schemes
discussed in [37][38].
Multiple physical link failures bring in more challenges for
cloud network mapping because (1) none of the survivable
mapping designs for single failure would work if a link
mapping is routed through multiple failed physical links; (2)
compared with a single physical link failure scenario which
has in total |EP | possible single physical link failures, there
exist C |EP |k number of k-edge combinations under the k-
failure scenario, which all need to be considered; (3) intu-
itively, to capture full information for k-link failures, where
k ∈ 1, . . . , |EP |, all possible k-link combinations should
be enumerated, which has an exponential number of com-
binations (2|EP | − 1); and last but not least, even though
there are only |RE | number of failure combinations in the
SRLG scenario, each element in RE may include different
number of links. Thus, it is important to explore a solution
approach for above problems without enumerating all possible
combinations, which is the key question we would like to
answer.
In this paper, we study the survivable cloud network
mapping problem against the generalized k physical link
failures and its special case, the SRLG failure. We propose
the necessary and sufficient conditions for survivable cloud
network mapping against multiple physical link failures and
design the exact solution approach through mixed-integer
linear program (MILP) formulations. The contributions of this
paper are as follows. We first study the survivable network
mapping problem against multiple-link failure scenarios and
prove the necessary and sufficient conditions for k- and SRLG-
survivability under a cross-layer network setting. Second,
different from the approaches in [29][30], our proposed exact
solution approaches do not enumerate all possible combina-
tions of failed physical link sets, which greatly reduces the
computation time. In addition to the mathematical formulation
approach, we also design a heuristic which can sequentially
generate and select logical spanning trees as well as their
corresponding tree branch mappings.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
the network setting in a cloud infrastructure and definitions
of k- and SRLG-survivability. Necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for cross-layer network survivability against k- and
SRLG- failures are presented in Section III. From the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions we propose in Section IV
the MILP formulations realizing the protecting spanning tree
concept for both k- and SRLG- failures. In Section V, we
present an SRLG-survivable algorithm which sequentially
selects protecting spanning trees and generates their corre-
sponding mappings. We also demonstrate its extension to k-
survivability. Finally, simulation results for both the MILP
model and proposed heuristic algorithm are reported in Section
VI.
II. NETWORK SETTING AND SURVIVABILITY
Notations utilized in this paper are presented in Table I. Let
GS = (VS , ES), GP = (VP , EP ) denote the virtual datacenter
and physical cloud infrastructure, respectively, where VS , VP
represent the node sets and ES , EP represent the link sets
in their corresponding network. Each s ∈ VS is mapped
onto a node u ∈ VP , while requests between nodes s and t,
represented as a link (s, t) ∈ ES , are realized through a route
(denoted as pst) in GP connecting s and t’s corresponding
nodes in VP . Here we use cloud network mapping to represent
both node and link mappings of the virtual datacenter. Let RE
denote an SRLG set containing all SRLG failure scenarios,
where each element r ∈ RE represents a single SRLG. Let
k(r) represent the number of physical links in SRLG r; i.e.,
r = {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (ik(r), jk(r))}.
Definition 1: A cloud network mapping is SRLG-
survivable if the virtual datacenter remains connected after
any SRLG failure in RE .
Definition 2: A cloud network mapping is k-survivable if
the virtual datacenter remains connected after arbitrary k
physical link failures.
For the virtual datacenter to survive k- and SRLG-failures,
at least a spanning tree τ should be available in its residual
network after failures. We use Fig. 2 to illustrate an SRLG-
survivable cloud network mapping.
Given the SRLG failure set RE = {r1, r2, r3} with r1 =
{I, IV }, r2 = {II, V }, and r3 = {V I, V II}. Each virtual
3Notation Representation
GP The physical cloud infrastructure, GP = (VP , EP )
with VP and EP as its node and edge sets
GS The virtual datacenter network, GS = (VS , ES)
with VS and ES as its node and edge sets
(i, j) The physical link, i, j ∈ VP , (i, j) ∈ EP
(s, t) The virtual link, s, t ∈ VS , (s, t) ∈ ES
RE Shared risk link groups (SRLGs), whose element
r = {(er1, er2, . . . , erk) : er` ∈ EP }, r ∈ RE
represents an SRLG
T Spanning tree set, T ⊂ GS , whose element τ ∈ T
is a spanning tree
pst The routing of (s, t) ∈ ES in GP , where pst ⊂ EP
Λ(i, j) A set of links in GS which are routed through phys-
ical link (i, j), i.e., {(s, t) : (i, j) ∈ pst, (s, t) ∈
ES}
Variables Representation
ystij binary variable which indicates whether pst is routed
through (i, j) or not, where (i, j) ∈ EP ; if yes,
ystij = 1, otherwise y
st
ij = 0
ysti1j1,··· ,ikjk binary variable which indicates whether pst is routed
through any links in (i1, j1),· · · ,(ik, jk); if yes,
ysti1j1,··· ,ikjk = 1, otherwise y
st
i1j1,··· ,ikjk = 0
µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk
binary variable which indicates if pst is not routed
through any of the links in (i1, j1),· · · ,(ik, jk);
if yes, µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk = 1, otherwise
µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk = 0
TABLE I
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Fig. 2. Survivable cloud network mapping with SRLG failure
machine in the virtual datacenter is mapped onto the physical
datacenter with the same index, and the virtual links {a, b, c, d}
connecting virtual machines mapped onto physical paths pa =
{I}, pb = {III}, pc = {II, V }, and pd = {V I, V II}. After
r1’s failure, a spanning tree τ1 = {b, c, d} is available in
the virtual datacenter, which makes it survivable. With the
existence of two other spanning trees τ2 = {a, b, d} and
τ3 = {a, b, c}, the virtual datacenter also remains connected
after SRLG r2 or r3 failures. Hence, with the given mapping,
the virtual datacenter is survivable after any SRLG failure
in RE , and we call spanning trees τ1, τ2, τ3 the protecting
spanning trees.
III. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR k-
AND SRLG-SURVIVABILITY
We present in this section the necessary and sufficient
conditions based on the spanning tree concept for both k- and
SRLG-survivability. We also include in Appendix the cutset-
based necessary and sufficient conditions.
A. Survivability Based on Protecting Spanning Trees
For any (i, j) ∈ EP , we let Λ(i, j) denote the set of links
(s, t) ∈ ES whose routes pass through (i, j), i.e., Λ(i, j) =
{(s, t) : (i, j) ∈ pst, (s, t) ∈ ES}. Let τ be a spanning tree
in the virtual datacenter where τ ⊂ GS . We now derive the
spanning-tree based necessary and sufficient conditions for k-
and SRLG-survivability as follows.
Lemma 1: A cloud network mapping is 1-survivable if and
only if after the failure of each (i, j) ∈ EP , there exists at
least a spanning tree τ ⊂ GS , such that
τ ∩ Λ(i, j) = ∅.
This lemma originated from the fact that a mapping is sur-
vivable if and only at least a spanning tree is embedded in
the virtual datacenter after any single physical link failure
(see [39]).
Extending this lemma, we get the following necessary and
sufficient conditions for k-survivability.
Theorem 1: A cloud network mapping is k-survivable if
and only if there exists at least a spanning tree τ ⊂ GS after
arbitrary k physical link failures, such that
τ
⋂ k⋃
β=1
Λ(iβ , jβ)
 = ∅,
where (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2) 6= · · · 6= (ik, jk) and
(i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (ik, jk) ∈ EP .
Proof: Necessary condition: if after any k-link failures, at
least a spanning tree structure is embedded in the residual vir-
tual datacenter, then the virtual datacenter remains connected.
Hence, the cloud network mapping is k-survivable.
Sufficient condition: If a cloud network mapping is k-
survivable, the virtual datacenter remains connected after any
k-link failures. Hence, at least a spanning tree structure exists
in the residual virtual datacenter.
Corollary 1: A cloud network mapping is SRLG-failure
survivable if and only if after any r ⊂ RE failure, there exists
4at least a spanning tree τ ⊂ GS , such that
τ
⋂ ⋃
(ir
k(r)
,jr
k(r)
)∈r
Λ(irk(r), j
r
k(r))
 = ∅. (1)
The above conclusion is a direct extension of Theorem 1
with the fact that the SRLG failure is a special case of the
generalized k-failure scenario.
We may now introduce our solution approaches based on the
necessary and sufficient conditions presented in this section.
IV. SOLUTION APPROACH I: MILP FORMULATIONS
In this section, we first present a mathematical programming
formulation for the survivable cloud network mapping problem
when arbitrary k-link failures occur in the physical cloud
infrastructure. We then present a formulation for the case of
SRLG failures.
We first introduce the variables used in the MILP formu-
lations. Let ystij be a variable which represents whether the
mapping of (s, t) ∈ ES is routed through (i, j) ∈ EP ;
if yes, ystij = 1, otherwise y
st
ij = 0. Let y
st
i1j1,··· ,ikjk be a
variable which equals 1 if (s, t)’s corresponding route in GP
passes through one or more of the links (i1, j1), · · · , (ik, jk),
where (s, t) ∈ ES , (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2) 6= · · · 6= (ik, jk) and
(iβ , jβ) ∈ EP with 1 ≤ β ≤ k; otherwise, this variable equals
0. We let µstij be a variable that equals 0 if the mapping of
link (s, t) ∈ ES is routed through (i, j) ∈ EP ; otherwise,
0 < µstij ≤ 1. Let µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk be a variable which
equals 0 if the link (s, t) ∈ ES is disconnected after the
failure of one or more of the links (i1, j1), . . . , (ik, jk), where
(i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2) 6= . . . 6= (ik, jk) and (iβ , jβ) ∈ EP with
1 ≤ β ≤ k; otherwise, 0 < µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk ≤ 1.
To express the condition in Theorem 1 in terms of variable
y, we propose the following lemmas which build the connec-
tion between links in the virtual datacenter and those in the
cloud infrastructure.
Lemma 2: Given (i1, j1), (i2, j2) ∈ EP , (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2)
and (s, t) ∈ ES . (s, t) has the property (s, t) ∈ Λ(i1, j1) ∪
Λ(i2, j2) if and only if ysti1j1,i2j2 = 1, which can be formulated
by
ysti1j1,i2j2 ≥ ysti1j1 + ystj1i1 , (2)
ysti1j1,i2j2 ≥ ysti2j2 + ystj2i2 , (3)
ysti1j1,i2j2 ≤ ysti1j1 + ystj1i1 + ysti2j2 + ystj2i2 . (4)
Proof of lemma 2 is given in Appendix C.
Extending Lemma 2, the following lemma shows the prop-
erty between a single virtual datacenter link and k links in the
cloud infrastructure.
Lemma 3: Given (i1, j1), . . . , (ik, jk) ∈ EP , (i1, j1) 6=
(i2, j2) 6= . . . 6= (ik, jk) and (s, t) ∈ ES . (s, t) has the prop-
erty (s, t) ∈ ⋃kβ=1 Λ(iβ , jβ) if and only if ysti1j1,··· ,ikjk = 1,
which can be formulated by
ysti1j1,...,ikjk ≥ ysti1j1 + ystj1i1 , (5)
. . . . . .
ysti1j1,...,ikjk ≥ ystik,jk + ystjkik , (6)
ysti1j1,...,ikjk ≤
k∑
β=1
(ystiβjβ + y
st
jβiβ
). (7)
Proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix C.
With Lemma 3, we may now derive the formulations for k-
and SRLG-survivable cloud network mapping.
Proposition 1: The relationship between µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk
and ysti1j1 , . . . , y
st
ikjk
can be captured by the following con-
straints:
µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk ≤ 1− (ysti1j1 + ystj1i1), (8)
µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk ≤ 1− (ysti2j2 + ystj2i2), (9)
. . . . . .
µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk ≤ 1− (ystikjk + ystjkik), (10)
(s, t) ∈ ES , (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2) 6= · · · 6= (ik, jk)
and (iβ , jβ) ∈ EP , ystiβjβ ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ β ≤ k. (11)
With variables y and µ, the feasible region of ystij , Y =
{ystij : Constraints (12) and (13), with i ∈ VP , }, determines
a cloud network mapping, where
∑
(i,j)∈EP
ystij −
∑
(j,i)∈EP
ystji =
 1, if i = s,−1, if i = t,
0, if i 6= {s, t},
(12)
ystij ∈ {0, 1}, (s, t) ∈ ES , (i, j) ∈ EP . (13)
Theorem 2: A cloud network mapping is k-survivable
against arbitrary k physical link failures, k ≥ 1, if and only if
the following conditions hold.
µsti1j1,i2j2,··· ,ikjk ≤ 1− (ystiβjβ + ystjβiβ ), 1 ≤ β ≤ k (14)∑
(s,t)∈ES
µsti1j1,...,ikjk −
∑
(t,s)∈ES
µtsi1j1,...,ikjk
=
{ −1, s = v0, v0 ∈ VS
1
|VS |−1 , s 6= v0, v0 ∈ VS
(15)
0 ≤ µsti1j1,i2j2,...,ikjk ≤ 1, (s, t) ∈ ES (16)
Constraint (15) captures the connectivity requirements (exis-
tence of a spanning tree).
Hence, the exact solution approach in MILP for the k-
survivable cloud network mapping against multiple physical
link failures is as follows:
min
∑
(s,t)∈ES
∑
(i,j)∈EP
ystij
s.t. Constraints (11) to (16).
Based on Corollary 1 and Theorem 2, we obtain the follow-
ing theorem which is a special case of Theorem 2 applicable
to the SRLG failure case.
5Theorem 3: A cloud network mapping is survivable after
SRLG failures, if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied. For any r ∈ RE ,
µstir1jr1 ,ir2jr2 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
≤ 1− (ystir1jr1 + y
st
jr1 i
r
1
) (17)
µstir1jr1 ,ir2jr2 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
≤ 1− (ystir2jr2 + y
st
jr2 i
r
2
) (18)
. . . . . .
µstir1jr1 ,ir2jr2 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
≤ 1− (ystir
k(r)
jr
k(r)
+ ystjr
k(r)
ir
k(r)
) (19)
∑
(s,t)∈ES
µstir1jr1 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
−
∑
(t,s)∈ES
µtsir1jr1 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
=
{ −1, s = v0, v0 ∈ VS
1
|VS |−1 , s 6= v0, v0 ∈ VS
(20)
0 ≤ µstir1jr1 ,ir2jr2 ,...,irk(r)jrk(r) ≤ 1, (s, t) ∈ ES (21)
where v0 is a selected root node in the virtual datacenter.
Now we have the following MILP formulation for survivable
cloud network mapping under SRLG failures which also
minimizes the physical link utilization.
min
∑
(s,t)∈ES
∑
(i,j)∈EP
ystij
s.t. Constraints (12), (13), (17) to (21)
We wish to note that the cutset-based formulations are
provided in Appendix A. The reasons why we chose the
tree-based formulation presented above instead of the cutset-
based one are that (1) all variables µ are fractional and (2)
the total number of binary variables is |EP ||ES |. It can be
observed that the cutset-based formulations are (1) with all
binary variables and (2) required to enumerate all cutsets,
which significantly increase the computational complexity of
the MILP formulation.
V. SOLUTION APPROACH II: HEURISTIC ALGORITHM
In this section, we first present the concept of optimal
protecting spanning tree collection and how it works for k-
and SRLG-survivability. Notations used in the following dis-
cussions are as follows. Let P be the cloud network mapping
with P = {pst, (s, t) ∈ ES}. Let RkF indicate the failure
set for all k-link failures, and r be an element in RkF . For
spanning tree τ ⊂ GS , we let EP (τ) = EP \ {∪(s,t)∈τpst}
and RkF (τ) = {r, r ∈ RkF , r ⊆EP \ {∪(s,t)∈τpst}} denote
the physical links and the SRLG failure sets protected by τ ,
respectively. We let T = {τ : (s, t) ∈ τ with pst} be the
spanning tree collection in the virtual datacenter.
A. Protecting Spanning Tree Collection and Failed Physical
Link Set
For SRLG failures, links in an SRLG fail simultaneously,
thus a set of these links is called a failure set. Given an
SRLG set RE , |RE | represents the total number of elements
in RE and C
|EP |
k is the total number of combinations for
arbitrary k-link failures. In this section, we investigate the
relation between protecting spanning trees and failure set.
Corollary 2: Given a cloud network and an SRLG set RE .
If a cloud network is SRLG-survivable, there exists at least
one spanning tree τ ⊆ GS such that r ∈ EP (τ) with r ∈ RE .
Corollary 2 presents the concept that at least one spanning
tree τ which remains connected after the failures of an SRLG
r ∈ RE , thus τ is said to protect all the physical links in r.
We may derive the following theorem addressing the maximal
number of spanning trees required to protect RE .
Theorem 4: Given a cloud network and an SRLG set RE .
The sufficient condition to guarantee an SRLG-survivable
cloud network design is that there exists up to |RE | number
of spanning trees, where each spanning tree’s branch routings
only travel through physical links in EP \ r, r ∈ RE .
Theorem 4 provides an observation that if each SRLG r ∈ RE
is uniquely protected by one spanning tree, then we need in
total |RE | spanning trees to protect the whole RE , which is
the upper bound. In other words, under this special optimal
condition, adding more spanning tree will not help further in
terms of survivability. In practice, each selected spanning tree
may protect not only one but more SRLGs. Therefore, we will
evaluate in Section VI the number of spanning trees required
to protect multiple failures.
Following the same concept as in Theorem 4, we may need
up to C |EP |k spanning trees to protect arbitrary k failures,
which is in fact way beyond the number of spanning trees
necessary to guarantee survivability. Here we would not further
discuss this property in detail but leave it for future study.
B. Heuristic: SRLG-Survivable Protecting Spanning Trees
Based on Theorem 4 and Corollary 2, we present an SRLG-
survivable algorithm which sequentially selects protecting
spanning trees and generates their corresponding mappings.
We also demonstrate its extension to k-survivability.
Let M be a large number. Algorithm 1 starts with generating
a minimal spanning tree whose branch mappings are with the
minimal costs. The algorithm then evaluates whether existing
tree(s) in the spanning tree set can protect at least an SRLG
through checking whether mappings of a tree’s branches (in T )
do not route through links in any SRLG. Then, the algorithm
only creates new spanning trees for unprotected SRLGs. We
update physical links in a unprotected SRLG set with higher
costs (the physical link cost times M ). The newly selected
spanning tree has the minimal spanning tree cost (based on
the newly updated physical link costs). Note here that with
the new tree generation, new branch link mappings may be
added for the same link in the virtual datacenter. We call it
virtual datacenter augmentation.
Algorithm 1 can easily be extended to k-survivable cloud
network design through constructing the failure sets RE con-
taining failures r with r = {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (ik, jk)},
where (i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (ik, jk) ∈ EP , and (i`, j`) 6=
(iβ , jβ) and 1 ≤ `, β ≤ k.
VI. EXPERIMENT SETTING AND SIMULATION RESULTS
We choose the NSF network, illustrated in Fig. 3, as the
network of the physical cloud infrastructure. To inspect
how the nodal degree would affect the performance of our
6Algorithm 1: Iterative SRLG-survivable protecting span-
ning tree algorithm
Input: Given GP = (VP , EP ), GS = (VS , ES) and
SRLG set RE ;
Output: Link mapping for all links in ES , a protecting
spanning tree set T , and its protected SRLG
sets;
1 Initialization: set ce = 1 for e ∈ EP and cu = 1 for
u ∈ ES ; set the protecting spanning tree set T = ∅; link
route Pu = ∅, u ∈ ES , and vector m = (0, · · · , 0)
indicating protected SRLG set with m ∈ {0, 1}1×|RE |;
2 for r ∈ RE do
3 if exists τ ∈ T such that r ∩ (∪u∈τ pˆu) = ∅ then
4 for u ∈ τ do
5 if Pu is ∅ then
6 Pu = pˆu;
7 else
8 ce = ce ×M, for all e ∈ r;
9 for u ∈ ES do
10 if Pu 6= ∅ then
11 cu = c(Pu);
12 else
13 Generate pˆu = min{pu : pu ∈ GP };
14 cu = c(pˆu);
15 Generate the minimal spanning tree based on cu:
τˆ = min{∑u∈τ cu, τ ∈ GS};
16 T = T ⋃{τˆ};
17 Reset link cost: ce = 1 for e ∈ EP , cu = 1 if
u ∈ ∪τ∈T τ ; otherwise, cu = cu ×M .
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Fig. 4. Virtual datacenter networks
algorithms, we also create “NSF(1)” which denotes the NSF
network augmented with link (6, 9). For the virtual datacen-
ter networks, we randomly generate two 3-edge connected
networks denoted as “CLN1” and “CLN3” and illustrated in
Fig. 4 in solid lines. For the same rationale, we also augment
“CLN1” and “CLN3” into 4-edge connected networks with
extra links illustrated in dashed lines, which create “CLN2”
and “CLN4” networks, respectively. The mapping of the nodes
from virtual datacenter to the physical cloud infrastructure is
presented through the same node indices printed in the nodes.
Table II provides the information of all the network topolo-
gies mentioned above, where “Conn”, “Nodes”, “Edges”,
“minDeg”, “maxDeg”, and ”AvgDeg” represent the edge-
connectivity, number of nodes/edges, minimal, maximal, and
average node degrees of the networks.
Conn Nodes Edges MinDeg MaxDeg AvgDeg
CLN 1 3 7 11 3 4 3.14
CLN 2 4 7 14 4 4 4
CLN 3 3 7 11 3 4 3.29
CLN 4 4 7 14 4 4 4
NSF 2 14 21 2 4 3
NSF(1) 3 14 22 3 4 3.14
TABLE II
LOGICAL TOPOLOGIES INFORMATION
In practice, the SRLG set is known a priori. We generate
a SRLG failure set called the 3-SRLG set, which has the
following properties: (1) each SRLG has three or fewer
edges (2) each SRLG is not a subset of another SRLG, (3)
each SRLG failure does not disconnect the physical network,
and (4) the union of all SRLGs covers the entire physical
network [40]. We also consider the k-failure scenario where
k = 2 due to the connectivity of our physical networks.
We use two metrics to validate and evaluate the performance
of our proposed spanning-tree based approaches: (1) full sur-
vivability and maximal partial survivability; and (2) minimal
physical resources utilized to guarantee full survivability or
maximal partial survivability. Note here that if a survivable
mapping does not exist due to the limitation of the given
networks (mainly because of their edge-connectivity), our
approach would generate a mapping which guarantees the
connectivity of the virtual datacenter against the most number
of failure scenarios.
We report our simulation results of the proposed MILP
approach in Tables III and IV for the SRLG- and 2-failure
scenarios, respectively. Out of the seven-element 3-SRLG set,
we test our formulation over five, six, and all seven 3-SRLG
failures to verify how many of the 3-SRLG failures can be
protected by the generated mapping. If not all of them can
be survivable, we report the maximal number of the 3-SRLGs
which do not disconnect the virtual datacenter. Let “Surv”,
“MaxS”, “PhyS” represent the existence of survivable cloud
network mapping for the tested instances, maximal number
of survivable SRLGs, and the minimal number of physical
links used in the routings. Let SIdx be the survivability index
which shows the number of arbitrary physical link pairs whose
7Five 3-SRLGs Six 3-SRLGs Seven 3-SRLGs
Surv MaxS PhyS Surv MaxS PhyS Surv MaxS PhyS
NSF
CLN 1 Yes 5 22 Yes 6 22 No 6 22
CLN 2 Yes 5 27 Yes 6 27 No 6 26
CLN 3 Yes 5 26 Yes 6 26 No 6 24
CLN 4 Yes 5 31 Yes 6 31 No 6 29
NSF(1)
CLN 1 Yes 5 21 Yes 6 21 Yes 7 21
CLN 2 Yes 5 26 Yes 6 26 Yes 7 26
CLN 3 Yes 5 23 Yes 6 24 Yes 7 24
CLN 4 Yes 5 29 Yes 6 29 Yes 7 29
TABLE III
MILP RESULTS FOR 3-SRLG FAILURES
NSF NSF(1)
Surv SIdx PhyS Surv SIdx PhyS
CLN 1 No 209 30 No 230 37
CLN 2 Yes 210 40 Yes 231 40
CLN 3 Yes 210 31 Yes 231 29
CLN 4 Yes 210 38 Yes 231 37
TABLE IV
MILP RESULTS FOR 2-LINK FAILURES
failures do not disconnect the virtual datacenter.
The results in Table III show that with the same physical
network, the routings of CLN2 and CLN4 consume more
physical links than that of CLN1 and CLN3, which results
from the more number of virtual links and higher connectivity
in CLN2 and CLN4. On the other hand, with the same
virtual network, the routing consumes more physical links
over NSF as the physical network than that with NSF(1),
which corresponds to the fact that NSF network has fewer
physical links and lower connectivity than NSF(1). At least for
all testing cases, the connectivity of both virtual and physical
networks impact the utilization of physical link consumption in
routes of virtual links. In a cross-layer network, higher virtual
network connectivity and lower physical network connectivity
lead to more physical link consumption. It is not surprising
that when the physical network has lower connectivity, the
survivable virtual link routings generated may require longer
physical paths. Similarly, with the same physical network, the
number of routings to be generated for a highly-connected
virtual network is larger than those with lower connectivity.
With Table IV, we observe that with the same physical
network and CLN1 as virtual network, there is no survivable
design for the cross-layer network. Meanwhile, CLN1 is with
smallest average node degree compared with CLN2, CLN3,
and CLN4. On the other hand, the node mapping between
virtual network and physical network are different between
CLN1-2 and CLN3-4. CLN1-2 maps onto physical node 2, 4,
and 7 at the same time, the shortest paths between (2,4) and
(2,7) have joint part. The mapping may lead to less physical
link consumption of CLN3-4 than CLN1-2. At least, for our
testing cases, the lower average virtual node degree leads
to more unsurvivable cross-layer topology. Meanwhile, the
node mapping between virtual network and physical network
NSF NSF(1)
PrctFSet PrctPct Time(s) PrctFSet PrctPct Time(s)
CLN1 -/210 - - -/231 - -
CLN2 200/210 95.24% 13.95 221/231 95.67% 13.86
CLN3 182/210 86.67% 12.98 202/231 87.01% 13.51
CLN4 209/210 99.52% 4.45 228/231 98.70% 5.83
TABLE V
ALGORITHM 1 RESULTS FOR 2-LINK FAILURE
Surv Augment# MaxS PhyS Tree# LogS Time(s)
NSF
CLN1 Yes 0 5 22 4 10 0.078
CLN2 Yes 0 5 27 4 9 0.140
CLN3 Yes 0 5 27 5 11 0.140
CLN4 Yes 0 5 31 5 11 0.062
NSF(1)
CLN1 Yes 0 5 21 5 10 0.124
CLN2 Yes 0 5 26 4 9 0.078
CLN3 Yes 0 5 23 5 11 0.102
CLN4 Yes 0 5 29 5 10 0.156
TABLE VI
ALGORITHM 1 RESULTS WITH FIVE 3-SRLG SETS
impacts the physical link consumption for virtual link routing.
As shown in Table IV, with NSF as the physical network,
our approach can generate survivable mappings for all virtual
datacenter networks against five and six 3-SRLG failures. But
none of them could produce survivable cloud mappings with
seven 3-SRLGs. After augmenting NSF to NSF(1), all virtual
datacenter networks remain connected against all five, six, and
seven 3-SRLG failures, which shows that SRLG-survivability
is sensitive to the physical node degrees. Meanwhile, it can
be observed that the utilization of physical links decreases
for some tested instances when increasing the number of 3-
SRLGs. Though it seems counterintuitive, it actually reflects
that the objective of the MILP formulations helps choose
shorter routings effectively while maintaining the (maximal)
survivability. All tested cases are solved within 1469 seconds.
We now evaluate the performance of our proposed Algo-
rithm 1 based on (1) whether the algorithm can provide SRLG-
survivable mapping, (2) how many SRLGs can be protected
if a survivable mapping does not exist, and (3) whether cloud
network link augmentation should be applied to provide better
protection. The results are presented in Tables V, VI, VII,
and VIII, where “Augment#”, “Tree#”, “LogS” and “Time”
denote the number of augmented logical links to produce
a survivable cloud mapping, the number of spanning trees
generated in the virtual datacenter, the number of links utilized
in the generated spanning tree set, and the computational time
(in second), respectively. We illustrate the number of physical
link utilization by MILP and heuristic approaches for 5, 6, and
7 SRLG sets in Figs. 5-7.
We present the performance of Algorithm 1 for 2-link failure
scenario in Table V. With NSF and NSF(1) as the physical
networks, the total number of 2-link failures is 210 and 231,
respectively. Let “PrctFSet” represent the number of protected
failure set and “PrctPct” as the percentage of the number
of protected sets to the total number of failure sets. The
8Surv Augment# MaxS PhyS Tree# LogS Time(s)
NSF
CLN1 Yes 0 6 22 5 10 0.100
CLN2 Yes 0 6 27 5 10 0.120
CLN3 Yes 0 6 27 6 11 0.083
CLN4 Yes 0 6 32 6 11 0.112
NSF(1)
CLN1 Yes 0 6 21 5 10 0.124
CLN2 Yes 0 6 26 5 9 0.078
CLN3 Yes 0 6 24 5 11 0.096
CLN4 Yes 0 6 30 5 11 0.113
TABLE VII
ALGORITHM 1 RESULTS WITH SIX 3-SRLG SETS
two numbers in column “PrctFSet” represent the number of
protected set followed by the total number of failure sets.
The best performance achieved by our algorithm is with NSF
and CLN4 as the physical and virtual networks. The average
protected percentage for all these testing cases are 93.81%.
There is no surprise that the MILP approach’s computation
time is much longer than that of the heuristic algorithm.
The average computation time with our MILP approach for
survivable routing with 3-SRLG failure and 2-failure are 11.93
and 194.88 seconds, respectively. Among all testing cases,
the longest computation time is 852.01 seconds (2-failure,
with NSF and CLN2 as the physical and logical networks,
respectively). As shown in Tables VI-VIII, the computation
time for our heuristic algorithm over all test cases is less than
0.16 seconds.
It can be observed in Tables VI to VIII that: (1) if SRLG-
survivable cloud network mapping exists, the results produced
by Algorithm 1 are as good as the ones generated by the
MILP formulation, (2) the number physical links utilized in
the routings produced by Algorithm 1 is the same or close
to the results of MILP formulation, and (3) for a physical
network with higher node degree, the generated cloud network
mappings seem to utilize less number of links both in the
physical cloud infrastructure and the virtual datacenter to
construct all protecting spanning trees and their routings.
As expected, Algorithm 1 cannot generate the survivable
cloud network mappings for all instances in Table VIII, which
triggers the augmentation of link(s) in the virtual datacenter
network. We wish to note here that we only augment CLN1
with both NSF and NSF(1)as the physical networks because
(1) we want to do both vertical (between NSF and NSF(1))
and horizontal (between Algorithm and MILP) comparisons,
and (2) we want to show how many 3-SRLGs can be protected
without augmentation. As seen in Table VIII, though not all
mappings generated by the heuristic are survivable, they still
can protect majority number of 3-SRLG failures.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the SRLG- and k-survivable cloud
network mapping problems and discussed how the concept
of the spanning tree can be used to guarantee survivabil-
ity. Based on the spanning tree concept, we proposed the
necessary and sufficient conditions and the corresponding
MILP formulations, which are applied in this paper as the
general framework to handle SRLG and k failures in a cloud
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9Surv Augment# MaxS PhyS Tree# LogS Time(s)
NSF
CLN1 No 1 5 25 5 10 0.085
CLN2 No 0 6 27 6 10 0.093
CLN3 No 0 6 28 6 12 0.110
CLN4 No 0 6 32 6 13 0.123
NSF(1)
CLN1 No 1 6 24 6 10 0.081
CLN2 Yes 0 7 26 6 10 0.097
CLN3 Yes 0 7 24 5 11 0.116
CLN4 Yes 0 7 30 5 11 0.146
TABLE VIII
ALGORITHM 1 RESULTS WITH SEVEN 3-SRLG SETS
network. In addition to the mathematical formulation, we
designed a heuristic algorithm also based on the spanning
tree concept. We compared the performance of the simulation
results generated by both the MILP formulation and heuristic
algorithm, which showed that our proposed Algorithm 1 can
effectively generate SRLG-survivable cloud network mappings
with quality similar to the optimal solution generated by the
MILP formulation. Also, the difference of physical resource
utilization between Algorithm 1 and the optimal solution is
within 5% in average and within 17% for all tested cases.
APPENDIX
This appendix includes three parts. We first present the
cutset-based cloud network mapping formulation for k- and
SRLG-survivability, which is the counterpart of our spanning-
tree based approach. We also provide their corresponding
MILP formulations. The second part provides the compar-
isons of complexity for the cutset- and spanning-tree-based
approaches in terms of the number of formulations generated.
The last one provides the proofs for Lemmas 2 and 3.
A. Cutset-Based Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Sur-
vivable Cloud Network Mapping
Let χ be a cutset in the virtual datacenter network, χ ⊂ GS .
Lemma 4: A cloud network mapping is 1-survivable if and
only if for each (i, j) ∈ EP ,
|χ ∩ Λ(i, j)| ≤ |χ| − 1, for all cutsets χ ⊂ GS ,
where | · | represents the cardinality of the set. This lemma
follows the fact that a mapping is survivable if and only if
any (i, j) failure would not disconnect all links in every single
cutset in the virtual datacenter.
Extending this lemma, we get the following necessary and
sufficient conditions for k-survivability.
Theorem 5: A cloud network mapping is k-survivable if
and only if after arbitrary k physical link failures,∣∣∣∣∣∣χ
⋂ k⋃
β=1
Λ(iβ , jβ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |χ| − 1, ∀χ ⊂ GS , (22)
where (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2) 6= · · · 6= (ik, jk) and
(i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (ik, jk) ∈ EP .
Proof: Necessary condition: after any k-link failures, if
all cuts are not fully disconnected (at least an edge in the cut
remains connected), the virtual datacenter remains connected.
Hence, the cloud network mapping is k−survivable.
Sufficient condition: If a cloud network is k−survivable, the
virtual datacenter is connected after any k-link failures, hence,
no cut is fully disconnected.
Corollary 3: A cloud network mapping is SRLG-survivable
if and only if after any r ∈ RE failure,∣∣∣∣∣∣χ
⋂ ⋃
(ir
k(r)
,jr
k(r)
)∈r
Λ(irk(r), j
r
k(r))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |χ| − 1,
for all cutsets χ ⊂ GS . (23)
The corollary above is a direct extension of Theorem 5.
Based on Theorem 5 and Lemma 3, we provide another
MILP formulation which guarantees that the cloud network
mapping is k-survivable. Following Lemma 3, the formulation
determines the relationship between ysti1j1,...,ikjk and y
st
iβjβ
,
1 ≤ β ≤ k, which indicates whether (s, t) is routed through
links in a subset of {(i1, j1), · · · , (ik, jk)}.
Proposition 2: A cloud network mapping is k-survivable,
k ≥ 1, if and only if the following condition holds:∑
(s,t)∈χ
ysti1j1,··· ,ik,jk ≤ |χ| − 1,
where χ ⊂ GS , (i1, j1), · · · , (ik, jk) ∈ EP ,
and (iq, jq) 6= (i`, j`), 1 ≤ q, ` ≤ k, (24)
ysti1j1,··· ,ik,jk ∈ {0, 1}. (25)
It is easy to verify that
∑
(s,t)∈χ y
st
i1j1,··· ,ik,jk =
|χ⋂⋃kβ−1 Λ(iβ , jβ)| based on the definition of ysti1j1,··· ,ik,jk ,
when {(i1, j1), · · · , (ik, jk)} is a k-link failure.
We provide the ILP formulation for k−survivability based
on the cutset concept as follows:
min
∑
(s,t)∈ES
∑
(i,j)∈EP
yijst
s.t. Constraint (2) to (4), (12), (13), (24) and (25).
Proposition 3: A cloud network mapping is survivable after
SRLG failures if and only if the following conditions hold: for
any r ∈ RE ,
constraint (24),
ystir1jr1 ,ir2jr2 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
≥ (ystir1jr1 + y
st
jr1 i
r
1
), (26)
ystir1jr1 ,ir2jr2 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
≥ (ystir2jr2 + y
st
jr2 i
r
2
), (27)
. . . . . .
ystir1jr1 ,ir2jr2 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
≥ (ystir
k(r)
jr
k(r)
+ ystjr
k(r)
ir
k(r)
), (28)
ystir1jr1 ,ir2jr2 ,...,irk(r)j
r
k(r)
∈ {0, 1}, (s, t) ∈ ES . (29)
The ILP formulation for SRLG-survivability based on the
concept of cutset is as follows:
min
∑
(s,t)∈ES
∑
(i,j)∈EP
yijst
s.t. Constraint (2) to (4), (12), (13), and (24) to (29).
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B. Complexity Comparision of the Spanning-Tree and Cutset
Based Approaches
The complexity of MILP models for both spanning-tree and
cutset-based formulations in terms of the numbers of variables
and constraints for SRLG- and k-survivability is shown in
Table IX. Let “Tree” and “Cutset” represent the spanning-
tree and cutset based MILP formulations, respectively. Here
|VP |, |EP |, |VS |, |ES | represent the node and edge numbers
in the physical cloud infrastructure and virtual datacenter,
respectively. We let rmax be an SRLG set with the maximum
number of physical edges in RE and N represent the number
of cutsets in GS .
Model SRLG k-survivable
Vrbs
Tree O[|ES |(|RE |+ |EP |)] O[|ES |(C|EP |k + |EP |)]
Cutset O[|ES |(|RE |+ |EP |)] O[|ES |(C|EP |k + |EP |)]
Cnts
Tree O[|ES ||VP |+|RE |(|ES |+ |VS |)]
O[|ES ||VP |+
C
|EP |
k (|ES |+ |VS |)]
Cutset O[|ES ||VP |+|RE |(|ES |+|VS |+2|VS |)]
O[|ES ||VP |+
C
|EP |
k (|ES |+ |VS |+
2|VS |)]
TABLE IX
COMPLEXITY OF MILP FORMULATIONS WITH NUMBER OF VARIABLES
AND CONSTRAINTS
We observe that the complexity of the formulation depends
mainly on the number of failure scenarios. Given an SRLG
set, the complexity of the formulation is bounded by the
cardinality of the SRLG set, the number of physical links in
an SRLG set, and the size of the physical infrastructure and
virtual datacenter. But for the generalized k-failure problem,
the complexity of the formulation increases exponentially with
the number of failed links. Comparing the complexity of tree-
based and cutset-based MILP formulations, the number of
variables are the same for both formulations, but the tree-based
formulation uses much less binary variables. The number of
constraints in the cutset-based model is significantly more
than that based on spanning trees because the cutset-based
formulation needs to enumerate all cutsets in the physical
network, which significantly increases the number of con-
straints. In general, it takes longer time to compute the optimal
result for an MILP formulation with more binary variables and
constraints. Hence, in this paper our focus is mainly on the
MILP formulation and heuristic based on the spanning tree
concept.
C. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof: Necessary condition: given a (s, t) ∈ ES and two
physical links (i1, j1), (i2, j2) ∈ EP , one of the following
four cases occurs: (i) (s, t) ∈ Λ(i1, j1)∩Λ(i2, j2); (ii) (s, t) ∈
Λ(i1, j1) ∩ Λ(i2, j2); (iii)(s, t) ∈ Λ(i1, j1) ∩ Λ(i2, j2); or (iv)
(s, t) ∈ Λ(i1, j1)∩Λ(i2, j2). For case (i), ysti1j1 +ystj1i1 = 1, so
ysti1j1,i2j2 = 1; for case (ii), y
st
i2j2
+ystj2i2 = 1, then, y
st
i1j1,i2j2
=
1; for case (iii), ysti1j1 + y
st
j1i1
= 1 and ysti2j2 + y
st
j2i2
= 1,
then, ysti1j1,i2j2 = 1; for case (iv), y
st
i1j1
= ystj1i1 = 0 and
ysti2j2 = y
st
j2i2
= 0, then, ysti1j1,i2j2 = 0. In all cases, constraints
(2) to (4) hold.
Sufficient condition: with constraints (2)–(4), if either
ysti1j1 + y
st
j1i1
= 1 or ysti2j2 + y
st
j2i2
= 1, then, ysti1j1,i2j2 = 1,
which implies that (s, t) ∈ Λ(i1, j1)∪Λ(i2, j2). Meanwhile, if
ysti1j1 = y
st
j1i1
= ysti2j2 = y
st
j2i2
= 0, then, ysti1j1,i2j2 = 0, which
implies that (s, t) ∈ Λ(i1, j1) ∩ Λ(i2, j2).
Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof: We prove this conclusion by induction for both
necessary and sufficient conditions.
Necessary condition: with Lemma 2, if β = 2, the conclusion
holds. We assume that if β = k − 1, the conclusion holds.
With β = k, four cases occur with [(i1, j1), · · · , (ik−1, jk−1)]
and (ik, jk) failures: (i) (s, t)’s mapping routes through
(ik, jk) only; (ii) (s, t)’s mapping routes through all or
part of [(i1, j1), · · · , (ik−1, jk−1)]; (iii) (s, t)’s mapping
routes through all or part of [(i1, j1), · · · , (ik−1, jk−1)] and
(ik, jk); and (iv) (s, t)’s mapping routes though none of
{(iq, jq) with 1 ≤ q ≤ k}. For case (i), ystikjk = 1, so
ysti1j1,··· ,ikjk = 1. For case (ii), with q = k − 1, there exists
some z (1 ≤ z ≤ k − 1), such that ystizjz + ystjziz = 1, so
ysti1j1,··· ,ik−1jk−1 = 1. Hence, y
st
i1j1,··· ,ikjk = 1. For case (iii),
if both ystikjk = 1 and y
st
i1j1,··· ,ik−1jk−1 = 1, y
st
i1j1,··· ,ikjk = 1.
These three cases imply that constraints (5)–(6) hold. For case
(iv), if ysti1j1 = y
st
j1i1
= · · · = ystikjk = ystjkik = 0, then
ysti1j1,··· ,ykjk = 0, which leads to constraint (7).
Sufficient condition: if β = 2, the conclusion holds with
Lemma 3. We assume that the conclusion holds when β =
k − 1. Now we prove that the conclusion holds when β = k.
Here, only two cases may occur: (i)(s, t) ∈ Λ(ik, jk), and
(ii) (s, t) ∈ Λ¯(ik, jk). For case (i), with ysti1j1,··· ,ikjk ≥
ystikjk+y
st
jkik
, it implies (s, t) ∈ ∪kκ=1Λ(iκ, jκ). For case (ii),
with β = k − 1, if constraints (5)–(6) lead to (s, t) ∈
∪k−1κ=1Λ(iκ, jκ), then (s, t) ∈ ∪kq=1Λ(iq, jq); otherwise,
ysti1j1,··· ,ik−1jk−1 ≤
∑k−1
q=1 y
st
iqjq+ystjqiq
which implies (s, t) ∈
∩k−1q=1Λ(iq, jq). With ysti1j1,··· ,ik−1jk−1 ≤
∑k−1
q=1 y
st
iqjq
+ystjqiq +
yikjk+yjkik , it implies (s, t) ∈ ∩kq=1Λ(iq, jq). Hence, the
conclusion holds when β = k.
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